What happened to Shield and First Guardian — and what investors can learn

Shield Master Fund and First Guardian Master Fund were investment schemes that froze in 2024 and later collapsed, after taking around $1.1 billion from roughly 12,000 Australians. Most of the money was superannuation, switched on the advice of cold-calling lead generators and financial advisers. Liquidators found large sums sent to related parties and offshore.

For the people involved, many of them ordinary workers and retirees, this was their retirement savings. This article sets out what happened, what regulators and platforms have done since, and what any investor can take from it. It is written with respect for those affected, not to score points.

What was the timeline?

Sources: ASIC Shield page, ASIC First Guardian page.

How did the super-switching model work?

The model had several links, and each one earned money along the way.

It usually began with an online ad or a cold call offering a free “super health check”. Lead generators passed interested people to financial advisers. The advisers recommended rolling the person’s super out of their existing fund into a new superannuation product on an investment platform. On that platform, the adviser directed the money into Shield or First Guardian.

The platform trustees were meant to act as gatekeepers, checking that the investment options they offered were sound. ASIC’s view is that some did not do this well enough. The investor, meanwhile, typically saw a platform statement showing units in a fund, with little insight into what the fund actually held.

Shield drew more than $480 million from at least 5,800 people, with about $321 million through Macquarie’s platform and about $160 million through Equity Trustees. First Guardian had about $446 million outstanding across roughly 6,000 investors.

Where did the money go?

In First Guardian’s case, liquidators found that $68.9 million went to entities associated with the director and $242 million was sent offshore. ASIC had earlier alleged that much of the fund’s reported value rested on cash receivables that were overdue.

For Shield, ASIC commenced proceedings in June 2026 against former Keystone directors, alleging they invested scheme money in related entities without proper safeguards. Those allegations are before the court.

The common thread is related-party dealing: money moving from investors to entities connected with the people running the scheme, inside a structure where investors could not see it happening.

What action has ASIC taken?

ASIC’s response has been broad, targeting nearly every link in the chain:

• Responsible entities and directors: asset freezes, receivers, liquidators and proceedings against former directors.
• Platform trustees: Macquarie admitted it did not act efficiently, honestly and fairly by failing to place Shield on a watch list; proceedings followed against Netwealth, Equity Trustees and Diversa.
• Advisers and licensees: bans on multiple advisers and the cancellation of at least one licence.
• Others: proceedings against a research house over its Shield rating and against First Guardian’s auditors.

ASIC Deputy Chair Sarah Court put the platform message plainly: trustees offering choice platforms “are on notice. They are gatekeepers for retirement savings.”

What compensation have investors received?

Compensation has depended heavily on which platform an investor used.

Macquarie (Shield). In September 2025 Macquarie committed to repay affected members on its platform 100% of the amount invested in Shield, less withdrawals, covering about $321 million.

Netwealth (First Guardian). Between March 2021 and December 2022, 1,303 members invested $128.5 million in First Guardian through Netwealth’s Super Accelerator Plus. In December 2025 Netwealth agreed to compensate them 100% of the amounts invested, less withdrawals, and by January 2026 had paid more than $100 million to over 1,000 affected investors. In August 2026 the Federal Court declared Netwealth had failed to make sufficient enquiries to understand the investment risk and had not told members about the fund’s potential illiquidity.

Investors who came through other platforms rely on liquidators’ recoveries, complaints processes and ASIC’s continuing actions.

What reforms has the government proposed?

In February 2026 Assistant Treasurer Daniel Mulino announced a crackdown on managed investment schemes. Treasury’s consultation paper set out six proposals:

Consultation closed on 27 February 2026. The proposals target the exact weaknesses Shield and First Guardian exposed: conflicted boards, related-party flows and switching patterns nobody was watching.

Were Shield and First Guardian private credit funds?

Not in the usual sense. They were master funds that invested in a range of underlying assets chosen by the manager, many of them hard to value and hard to see. They were not straightforward lending funds secured by registered mortgages.

Still, they sit in the same conversation, because the weaknesses overlap. ASIC’s review of private credit funds, REP 820, found weak conflicts policies, fees kept from investors’ view and the same committees approving and then valuing loans. None of that is fraud. But opacity and conflicts are the conditions in which fraud goes unnoticed, and they can exist inside any pooled vehicle, however respectable its label.

That is why the right question is not “is this a private credit fund or a master fund?” It is “can I see what my money is doing, and who benefits along the way?”

What are the lessons for investors?

Regulation can reduce the odds of a repeat. It cannot replace an investor’s own checks. Three lessons stand out.

Know the asset. “Units in a diversified fund” is not an answer. Ask what, specifically, your money will fund, and insist on seeing it.

See the security. If your money is lent against property, you should be able to identify the property and confirm the security exists. The strongest version is being named on the registered mortgage yourself, which lets you verify it on the public register rather than relying on a manager’s report. We explain the difference in direct mortgage investment vs pooled funds.

Check the conflicts. Who is paid at each step, and does any money flow to the manager’s own associates? Our list of questions to ask a private credit manager covers the ones that matter.

It is also worth being wary of any unsolicited call urging you to move your super. If you run an SMSF, our page for SMSF investors sets out how co-funding fits a trustee’s obligations.

Why is being named on the mortgage the ultimate look-through?

A master fund investor sees a unit price. A direct mortgage investor sees a property, a borrower, a loan agreement in their own name and a registered interest on title.

HomeSec Business Finance, an Australian private lender founded in 2004, is not a pooled fund. It invites wholesale investors to co-fund specific loans alongside its own money. You receive each loan’s due diligence pack, decide whether to fund it, and are named on the registered mortgage for your exact contribution. Principal and interest are paid straight to your own bank account, not to HomeSec. There is no pool for money to move through unseen. The full process is set out in how it works.

If you’d like to see exactly what that level of visibility looks like on a real loan, register your interest and our Funding Manager will be in touch.